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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
*

Appellate Court No.

*

Priority No.

920623-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
15

vs.
*

MARY E. RANDOLPH,
*

Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff/Appellee's Statement of Facts contain errors,
mis-statements and is principally a summation of his own testimony
that was disputed and/or contradicted by Defendant/Appellant's
testimony and evidence.
There is no set formula for the division of assets or debts.
In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the trial Court is
not required to divide marital assets or debts equally and may make
such orders concerning property distribution and debts as are
equitable.
Plaintiff/Appellee's contention that the Order that required
him to pay 1/2 of the cost of private school for the two (2) minor
children, in addition to child support was abuse of discretion is
1
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without merit where he essentially agreed to private schooling and
to pay the cost.
The question of maintaining life insurance coverage lies
within the sound discretion of the trial Court.

The Order that

Plaintiff/Appellee continue to maintain his present policy of life
insurance for the protection and benefit of Defendant/Appellant,
wife and children, was not abuse of discretion where the combined
ordered

child

support

and

alimony

obligation

would

exceed

$222,000.00.
The denial of Plaintiff/Appellee's post trial Motion to set
aside the Stipulation to custody was proper where a material change
of circumstances had not occurred and the Motion

failed to meet

the Hogge test.

ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACT CONTAINED ERRORS.
MIS-STATEMENTS AND IS PRINCIPALLY A SUMMATION OF HIS OWN
TESTIMONY THAT WAS DISPUTED AND/OR CONTRADICTED BY DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE.
1. Plaintiff/Appellee testified that he received, in addition
to his base salary from Kennecott, an annual "performance bonus."
His use of the term "commissions" is misleading and incorrect.
(T. 14-15).
2.
time

of

The statement that Plaintiff/Appellee's income, at the
trial

was

$114,500.00

annually,

which

2
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included

a

substantial bonus ($26,000.00) is true and correct.

The bonus

amount set forth in the Statement of Facts of $14,500.00 is not
correct.

The bonus amount was $26,000.00 and the net amount was

approximately $16,900.00. (T. 14)

Plaintiff's base annual salary

of $88,500.00 ($ 7,375.00 per month) with the $26,000.00 bonus made
his total income, at the time of trial, $114,500.00 annually
($9,542.00 per month), for the purpose of determining the child
support obligation of $1,3 61.00 per month, in compliance with the
statutory Guidelines.

The determination and the amount of the

support was not disputed.

(T. 22)

The $26,000.00 bonus he

received prior to trial was $6,000.00 more than the $20,000.00
bonus he received in 1991.
3.

(T. 14).

Plaintiff/Appellee's

statement,

"Defendant

worked

different jobs during the marriage" is misleading and contrary to
the testimony of Defendant/Appellant.

She testified, without

contradiction, she worked the first two (2) years of the marriage.
That she had not worked since 1979, other than tending children in
the home when they lived in Boston and Mr. Randolph attended
Harvard University to get his Master's Degree during 1988-90.
(T. 153-154)
4. The statement of Plaintiff/Appellee that he contested the
request of Defendant/Appellant that he pay 1/2 of the children's
private school cost is not supported by the record.

Plaintiff

stated, in response to a question from his counsel, "he believed
that the child support award of $1,361.00 would be adequate to meet
3
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the needs of the children, including private school.11

(T. 22-23)

Plaintiff/Appellee did not dispute or contradict the statement of
Defendant/Appellant that he agreed to private schooling for the
minor children, that the cost was approximately $1,700.00 per year
(not including summer camp) and the understanding was he would
share in the cost of the children's private schooling. (T. 138; 140)
5.

The statement of Plaintiff/Appellee that he proposed to

pay alimony to Defendant of $1,100.00 per month is basically
correct and disputed.

However, it is important to point out that

the "Troy receivable11 was a joint marital asset which the Defendant
held a 1/2 interest.

The inference and innuendo is that Plaintiff

is treating the "Troy receivable" as his sole asset in his proposal
to award it to Defendant in lieu of additional alimony.
6. Plaintiff/Appellee's statement that the ready access loan
and tax liability were marital debts is disputed by the record. He
acknowledges the ready access loan was taken out by him solely
after separation (T. 32) ; had essentially closed the parties joint
bank accounts or removed all of the funds from the joint accounts
and placed them in accounts solely in his name; (T. 122-127) had at
his disposal $48,000.00 before taxes

(T. 119-120) paying only

$500.00 to the Defendant, which he claimed to be alimony for July,
1991 (T. 127) ; leaving Defendant and the minor children without
adequate finances and in near destitute circumstances, in contrast
to the past practice of providing $1,500.00 to $2,000.00 per month
to Defendant for household expenses.

(T. 172)

4
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7.

The statement in Plaintiff/Appellee's Statement of Facts

that Defendant testified she used $1,500.00 of joint funds for her
initial attorney's fees and costs is true and not disputed.
Plaintiff neglects to set forth and state that he paid more than
$1,700.00 as attorney's fees and costs to his first attorney, Mr.
Hettinger, from the parties joint funds that he had removed from
their joint money market account.

(T. 129-30)

II.

THERE IS NO SET FORMULA FOR THE DIVISION OF ASSETS OR
DEBTS.
IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY,
THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO DIVIDE MARITAL ASSETS OR
DEBTS EQUALLY AND MAY MAKE SUCH ORDERS CONCERNING PROPERTY
DISTRIBUTION AND DEBTS AS ARE EQUITABLE.
1. In dividing a marital estate, the trial Court is empowered
to enter equitable orders concerning property distribution, as well
as debts and obligations.

30-3-5(1)(c) U.C.A.

The Court is

permitted considerable discretion in making such orders, which will
not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
discretion.

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1313 (Ut. C.A. 88)

There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of
properties in a divorce action.
C.A. 92);

Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1 (Ut.

Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d

1144

Plaintiff/Appellee's argument that property

(Ut. C.A. 88)

should be divided

"equally" is not supported by law or the facts and circumstances
5
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present in this case.
2.

Plaintiff/Appellee, in his argument, did not mention the

fact he retained a 1972 Porsche 911 that he reportedly sold for
$8,400.00.

He retained all of these proceeds as his separate

property and used them to purchase the 1992 Ford Explorer, listing
the loan he obtained as one of his debts.

(Plaintiff's Addendum F)

The sale of the Porsche and purchase of the Ford Explorer occurred
after separation, during the pendency of the action.

Plaintiff

sought and obtained an Order that he be authorized to sell the
Porsche, as well as the marital residence.

(R. 50-51; 71-76)

After the marital residence was sold and the proceeds divided
pursuant to the earlier order of the Court, Defendant did not pay
off the Ford Explorer loan, using the loan as a deduction against
income.

(Exhibit P-7, Addendum F)

As a side note, it should be

pointed out that the calculations on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-7,
Addendum F, contain errors with estimated and unverified deductions
for taxes.

Plaintiff deducted as an expense against gross income

his personal tax exemption.

The personal tax exemption is not a

payment but a tax credit against
determining tax liability.

income

for the purpose of

This error, coupled with estimated

unverified tax liability, without considering the Court awarded
Plaintiff the two (2) minor children as additional tax exemptions,
results in Plaintiff's claimed

"actual monthly

income11 to be

substantially understated.
3. Plaintiff, in his argument, did not mention the fact that
6
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the original ready-credit loan account had been paid off in full.
That the ready-credit debt was incurred solely by him after
separation.

He played a "shell game" with the parties joint funds

that he removed from joint accounts approximating $11,900.00, and
deposited into various new accounts in his name solely.

That he

retained for his own use funds in excess of $8,000.00.

(T. 123-

126) That he paid temporary alimony to Defendant out of the joint
funds transferred from the parties joint money market account.
(T. 127)

Defendant only received $2,000.00 of the joint money

market funds, which he deposited in her checking account that he
sometimes

wrote

checks

against.

(T.

123-127)

Plaintiff

deliberately had the bank statements sent to his work address" so
the Defendant would not have knowledge of these financial dealings.
Although Plaintiff stated it was his intent to equalize the funds
he took control of, it didn't happen.
4.

(T. 128)

Plaintiff does not mention in his Argument that he

retained the entire amount of the bonus he received in 1992 as a
performance bonus for 1991 in the net amount of approximately
$16,900.00.

Also, that he had at his disposal in the first three

(3) months of 1992, net income of $32,000.00, more than enough to
meet his expenses and pay off in full the ready-access debt, as
well as the tax liability he claimed.

The trial Court was well

within its discretionary authority to consider these facts in
rendering its decision.
5.

Plaintiff proposed that Defendant be awarded the "Troy
7
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receivable,"

a jointly owned asset, to in effect reduce his

alimony obligation to Defendant.

He now advances the argument,

because the Court did what he asked, but awarded $1,500.00 alimony
to Defendant, this was an unequal division of marital property and
the Court abused its discretion.
and should be disregarded.

This argument is inconsistent

Plaintiff does not claim the division

of property was "inequitable or that it was not fairly divided"
only that it is not "equal."

Under the law and the circumstances

at the time of the divorce, Plaintiff's argument fails to meet his
burden that the division of property and the order he pay the post
separation debts is so inequitable, to be clearly unjust, and a
clear abuse of discretion.
6.

Rasband v. Rasband, supra.

Plaintiff points out that the Court must issue sufficient

findings to demonstrate an award of property other than equal.
This issue was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v.
Jones. 700 P. 2d 1072 at Page 1074.

Plaintiff, Mr. Randolph, as in

the Jones case, prepared the Findings of Fact and claims that there
has been an unequal division of property.

The Utah Supreme Court,

on this issue, stated:
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the
wife and remand for findings on the specific value
of assets.
In this case, however, the wife's
attorney prepared the inadequate Findings of Fact,
she challenges on appeal, and the Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce, all of which the Court
entered without alteration.
Counsel for the wife
made no motion to have the trial Court amend the
Findings to include values.
(See Ut. R. CIV. P.
52(b)
The wife cannot come now, . . . . and
complain of her own failure to include specific
8
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property values in the Findings of Fact.
In order to challenge the trial Court's Findings of Fact, Plaintiff
as Cross-Appellant, must first marshall the evidence which supports
the Findings and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, it
is clearly erroneous.

Plaintiff has not met his burden of

overriding the presumption of the validity of the Court's Order
distributing property and ordering Defendant to pay the post
separation debts.
Ill
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S CONTENTION THAT THE ORDER THAT
REQUIRED HIM TO PAY 1/2 OF THE COST OF PRIVATE SCHOOL
FOR THE TWO (2) MINOR CHILDREN, IN ADDITION TO CHILD
SUPPORT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS WITHOUT MERIT WHERE HE
ESSENTIALLY AGREED TO PRIVATE SCHOOLING AND TO PAY THE COST.
1.

Mr. Randolph, during the marriage, before separation and

after separation, agreed with Mrs. Randolph that the children
attend private school.

He agreed to share the cost after

separation to the time of trial.

The worksheet he presented at

trial, of Defendant's living expenses, to demonstrate, in his
opinion, that the base support required under the Guidelines was
sufficient to cover the expense of private school, is flawed.
Addendum I (Exhibit P-6) did not include the cost for summer camp
or uniforms for the girls.

He estimated college expenses for Mrs.

Randolph to be $177.00 per month, dividing the quarterly expenses
of $707.00 by four (4) months.

Quarterly expenses should be
9
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divided by three (3) months and in fact exceeded $2 3 6.00 per month.
Mr. Randolph only provided for eight (8) months of child care (3
quarters) rather than a full year, although Mrs. Randolph testified
that she would attend college during the summers to meet her
anticipated graduation where she was carrying less than 12 hours
per quarter.
2.

Plaintiff's argument that school expenses should be

considered part of the base support amount calculated under the
Guidelines

is

not

supported.

Review

of

Section

78-45-2

(Definitions) and 78-45-7.14 (Base Support) does not indicate that
the cost of private school is included in the base support table.
The Uniform Support Act does state that the base support table is
adjusted for taxes and the claiming of tax exemptions.

The Court

awarded Plaintiff the tax exemptions for both children without a
corresponding

increase

in

the

base

support

amount

without

considering the higher tax liability resulting to Mrs. Randolph.
Given the fact that the cost of private schooling is not included
in the base support table under the Uniform Guidelines, there is no
maximum limit on the base child support award that may be ordered,
except where it would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted income,
Plaintiff's argument on this issue must fail.
U.C.A.)
schooling

(See 78-45-7.18

The Order that Plaintiff pay 1/2 of the cost of private
for the minor children, in addition to base child

support, does not exceed the 50% limitation, is not a deviation or
rebuttal of the Guidelines requiring specific findings by the
10
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Court.

It should be pointed out that child care expenses and

uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the base
child support tables.

(78-45-7.15 and 7.16 U.C.A.)

Therefore, it

is reasonable to conclude that cost of private schooling is a
separate issue to be determined by the trial Court. The Order that
Plaintiff continue to share the cost of private schooling was not
abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances.
IV
THE QUESTION OF MAINTAINING LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE LIES
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. THE ORDER
THAT PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN HIS PRESENT
POLICY OF LIFE INSURANCE FOR THE PROTECTION AND BENEFIT OF
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, WIFE AND CHILDREN, WAS NOT ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHERE THE COMBINED ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY OBLIGATION WOULD EXCEED $222,000.00 .
1.

Plaintiff does not claim he has been prejudiced in any

manner by the trial Court's Order that he continue to maintain in
force 1/2 of his present life insurance through his employment at
Kennecott

for the benefit of Plaintiff until

termination of

alimony.

In fact, the premium cost for his $200,000.00 term life

policy is $15.93 per month, which is deemed nominal.

(Exhibit P-3)

The fact Plaintiff had the policy in force at the time of trial is
deemed a sufficient basis for the Court's Order.

Given the

additional facts that there are substantial bond funds ordered to
be held for the children's post high school education, and that
Defendant has an incurable disease, as stated by Plaintiff,
11
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(T. 9) it is highly conceivable that alimony may be extended beyond
the time period ordered by the Court, should there be a substantial
change in Defendant's circumstances.
2.

The combined ordered obligation of alimony and child

support exceeds $220,000.00.

The amount of insurance ordered to

be carried by Plaintiff for the benefit of both Defendant and the
two

(2) minor children, is $200,000.00,

$22,000.00 less than the combined total.

(FOF Index 251-252)
Absent a clear showing

of abuse of discretion, it was not error for the Court to divide
Defendant's present life insurance coverage between the minor
children and Defendant, in view of the bond funds held for the
benefit of the children.
be disturbed.

The Order of the trial Court should not

The requirement that Plaintiff maintain part of his

life insurance coverage for the benefit of the Defendant, wife,
until alimony terminates, is a proper exercise of the trial Court's
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the
parties.
IV
A DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S POST TRIAL MOTION TO
SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION TO CUSTODY WAS PROPER WHERE A
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAD NOT OCCURRED AND THE
MOTION FAILED TO MEET THE HOGGE TEST.
1.

Plaintiff was provided ample opportunity to pursue the

issue of custody during the entire pendency of the divorce action.
At various times he used the threat of pursuing custody to harass
12
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Defendant and in an effort to enhance his bargaining position•
After the initial hearing on the Temporary Order for Relief, which
awarded temporary custody to Defendant, to the time of the October
Pre-trial Conference, Plaintiff did very little to pursue the
custody issue.

Upon Plaintiff's representation that he was going

to actively pursue the custody issue, the October, 1991 Pre-trial
Settlement Conference was continued, without date, to allow him to
obtain a custody evaluation.

(R. 125)

Plaintiff changed

attorney1s and without pursuing the requested custody evaluation,
notified the Domestic Relations Commissioner, Michael Evans, that
he no longer was seeking custody of the two (2) minor children, did
not intend to pursue the custody evaluation as previously ordered,
and requested that the case be certified to the Court for trial.
(R. 126-128)

The case was certified for trial by written Minute

Entry, November 21, 1991.

The case was set for trial February 18,

1992, at which time Plaintiff obtained a bifurcated Decree of
Divorce.

He then hastily remarried.

Trial of the financial and

property issues was held March 24, 1992, giving Plaintiff more than
adequate time to pursue the custody issue if he truly desired.
2.

The Motion of Plaintiff to withdraw his Stipulation to

Custody did not meet the required test of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P. 2d
51 (Ut. 1982) clarified by Becker v. Becker, 694 P. 2d 608 (Ut.
1984), to-wit:
The party seeking custody must prove that there has
been a change in the circumstances upon which the
previous custody award was based, which substantially
13
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and materially affects the custodial parent's parenting
ability or the functioning of the custodial relationship.
Plaintiff

claims,

in his Motion, that

he

entered

Stipulation to Custody upon a faulty premise.
forth

in

paragraphs

1

through

4

of

his

into

the

The matters set
Motion

relate

to

circumstances which existed prior to filing the divorce Complaint,
and the trial of March, 1992.
Plaintiff's

not the

The claimed faulty premise was

Defendant's

or the

trial

Court.

The

statements, claims and allegations of Plaintiff set forth in
paragraphs 5 through 10 of his Motion deal with claimed insulting
and demeaning messages alleged to have been left on Plaintiff's
answering machine by Defendant, directed at Plaintiff and his new
wife, together with unsubstantiated and unsupported claims relating
to problems with visitation.

Defendant's Verified Reply to

Plaintiff's Motion contested and thoroughly refuted the claims of
Plaintiff.

It is apparent that the trial Court, after review of

Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant's Verified Reply thereto and the
history of this case, concluded that under the Hogge and Becker
standard, there was no showing of a change

in circumstances

materially

fitness, as the

affecting

Defendant's

ability

or

custodial parent, to care for the children.

That any claimed

changes in the circumstances of Plaintiff as the noncustodial
parent, to-wit: his remarriage and relationship with his new wife,
were irrelevant.

There being no showing of a material change of

circumstances affecting Defendant's ability or fitness to care for
14
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the children as the custodial parent, the denial of Plaintiff's
Motion by the trial Court was proper.

CONCLUSION
The relief sought by Plaintiff on his Cross-Appeal should be
denied.

The arbitrary reduction of alimony awarded Defendant

(wife) and automatic termination after four

(4) years, being

contrary to law, should be reversed and Defendant awarded permanent
alimony under the circumstances established by the evidence.
The award of alimony to Defendant should be increased to an
amount sufficient to meet the reasonable and necessary needs of
Defendant, under the financial circumstances established by the
evidence, so as to equalize the parties post divorce standard of
living as near as possible to that enjoyed by the parties prior to
the divorce.
The award of attorney's fees to Defendant should be increased
to $2,800.00 and she awarded attorney's fees on this Appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

/ //~day of June, 1993.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Kellie F. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, 310 South
Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this

/ *-

day of June, 1993.
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E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No* 1032
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
*
*

DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
STIPULATION

*

Civil No.

*

Judge Sawaya

Plaintiff,
vs.

914902308 DA

MARY E. RANDOLPH,
Defendant.

Defendant, Mary Randolph, by and through her attorney of
record, E. H. Fankhauser, pursuant to Rules 6.401 and 4.501(b),
Utah

Code of Judicial Administration,

submits the

following

Verified Reply and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw
Stipulation regarding the issue of custody.
OBJECTION TO MOTION
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 6401(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which requires all
domestic relation matters filed in the District Courts, in Counties
1
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where Commissioners are appointed and serving, to be referred to
the Commissioner, upon filing with the Clerk of the Court unless
otherwise

ordered

by

the

presiding

Judge

of

the

District.

Plaintiff has not sought or obtained an order from the presiding
Judge which would authorize the Plaintiff to bring this Motion
directly before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.

The Motion of Plaintiff is improperly

before the Court and should be dismissed and denied.
VERIFIED REPLY TO MOTION
1. In the event the Court should authorize Plaintiff's Motion
to be brought and determined pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, his statement as to filing a Complaint,
requesting award of custody, the birthdates of the two (2) minor
children and that the Plaintiff wilfully withdrew his request for
custody of the children is basically true and correct.

The

reason(s) Plaintiff claims that he withdrew his request for the
award of custody is disputed and denied by the Defendant on the
basis that the same is deemed to be a misrepresentation on the part
of Plaintiff and without merit.
2. The statements of Plaintiff regarding Defendant's illness
in paragraph 2 of his Verified Motion is a situation and fact that
was well known to Plaintiff, both prior to the filing of his
Complaint for divorce seeking custody, the hearing on the Temporary
Order which awarded temporary custody to the Defendant during the
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pendency of the action. Plaintiff relied upon Defendant's illness
as the basis for him being awarded temporary custody which was
rejected

and

denied

by

the

Domestic Relations

Commissioner.

Plaintiff, at the Pre-trial Settlement Conference, voluntarily
withdrew his quest for custody, without any representations made on
the part of Defendant or his reliance on such.

Defendant takes

issue with Plaintiff's categorization of her illness as being an
incurable mental illness due to the fact that it is diagnosed as a
bi-polar disorder, directly associated with a chemical imbalance.
That her condition is controlled and treated with Lithium Carbonate
is not disputed.

The mere fact that Lithium is prescribed and

Defendant takes Lithium on a regular basis does not mean another
episode will occur. There is no medical basis for that statement
by Plaintiff.
3.

During Defendant's first manic episode, which began in

January, 1990, she continued caring for the family and the minor
children.

She was attending school, taking night courses, in

addition to providing day care for five (5) other children during
the day time hours from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. without any
assistance or help from Plaintiff, who failed to notice Defendant
was experiencing any problem.

Defendant continued working and

providing day care service up to the day before she entered the
hospital.

One of the day care mothers, who is a registered

psychiatric nurse practitioner, observed Defendant's condition of
fatigue, brought on by lack of sleep, weight loss and the inability
3
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to concentrate.

She called the Plaintiff, requesting that he do

something to assist Defendant in that she was concerned about
Defendant's welfare.
deeply

religious

and

Plaintifffs claim that Defendant became
ignored

the

children

and

her

family

responsibility is denied to the extent that Defendant continued to
perform up to the time that her condition was brought to the
attention of Plaintiff and she was required to be hospitalized for
medical treatment.
One month prior to the first manic episode, the Plaintiff, Mr.
Randolph, lost his temper during an argument and physically abused
Defendant by throwing her from room to room and into furniture,
walls and finally on to the floor, while the children watched in
horror, crying and protesting.

This incident contributed to

Defendant's manic episode, according to Defendant's physicians and
researchers at McLeans Hospital in Massachusetts.
4.

Plaintiff's claim that the second manic episode occurred

in February, 1991 is true.

The statement that it was because

Defendant was experimenting with a reduced drug dosage of Lithium
is denied on the basis that it is a misrepresentation of the true
facts.

Defendant previously filed an Affidavit with the Court in

connection with the hearing for temporary custody, detailing the
situation which occurred in February, 1991. Defendant requests the
Court to review the Affidavit.

Defendant states that she did not

begin "experimenting with Lithium." Defendant's psychiatrist felt
that her condition had improved substantially and that all had gone
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well for approximate one (1) yearf rendering it possible to reduce
the dosage gradually in increments from 900 mg. to 450 mg. At the
level of 450 mg., Defendant began to experience symptoms similar to
those of the previous year.

During this exact time Defendant

decided to divorce Plaintiff and packed bags for herself and the
children, intending to drive to Denver, at which time she would
notify her family of her decision to divorce Plaintiff. Defendant
did not tell Plaintiff that she was going to divorce him, due to
the fact she was afraid of his rages of anger and that the
Plaintiff would harm her physically, as well as the children.
Defendant did go to Denver as planned and it was during this time
that she began to suffer the second manic episode.
Plaintiff's

claim

that

Defendant

skipped

psychiatric

counseling during this period is denied. The fact is Defendant did
not skip psychiatric counseling during this period and her doctor
was monitoring her closely because of the changes in dosage, until
Defendant drove to Denver with the children in anticipation of
filing divorce against Plaintiff.

Defendant missed one (1)

appointment and that was the day she left for Denver.

Defendant

did not stop taking her medication, Synthroid, until she entered
Western

Institute

of

Neuropsychology.

The

staff

at Western

Institute did not provide or offer the medication to Defendant.
Defendant's sister, who was pregnant, is a psychiatric nurse,
employed at a drug and rehab hospital in Denver.

Defendant's

sister contacted Defendant's psychiatrist in Salt Lake City, Dr.
5
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Joe. Culbertson, and told him that Defendant's behavior seemed
normal but the unexpected trip concerned her and discussed with Dr.
Culbertson the feasibility of hospitalizing Defendant for Lithium
stabilization in Denver or Salt Lake City.
At the time Defendant returned to Salt Lake City, Plaintiff
began making dinner, turkey meatloaf in a heart shaped pan and
became very demanding and adamant that their 4 year old daughter,
who had snacked most of the way back from Denver, be forced to eat
it.

The child was crying and Defendant tried to intercede and

requested that the Plaintiff not force the child to eat food when
she was not hungry.

Plaintiff flexed his arm muscles and made

growling noises, causing Defendant to be fearful for her safety and
the safety of the youngest daughter.

Defendant sought shelter at

the Catholic Church until the coordinator from Mar iliac House (this
woman also spent three months living in our basement) could come
and pick Defendant up. Their records will show Defendant spent one
(1) night there because the following day Defendant notified her
psychiatrist, Dr. Culbertson, that she was in town, made an
appointment with him.

She kept the appointment and at that time

Dr. Culbertson decided that Defendant should check into Western
Institute. Defendant agreed to follow the advise of her doctor and
go to Western Institute because she felt it was safer than her own
home.

The statement of Plaintiff that Defendant refused to be

admitted to hospitalization is not true in that Defendant was
referred to Western Institute by her doctor.
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000177

To the best of Defendant's knowledge, she did not physically
attack anyone.

Defendant does recall that staff members and her

doctor assisted her into intensive care.

Defendant denies the

allegations of Plaintiff that she lit the garbage can on fire.
However, there was an argument between Defendant and a staff member
because Defendant put her cigarette out in the trash can instead of
an ashtray.
Defendant was placed in isolation by her own choice.

The

staff personnel never used physical restraints on Defendant, in
isolation or any other time. Defendant spent approximately two (2)
weeks at Western Institute and two (2) weeks at the University
Hospital
5.

The statements contained in paragraph 3 of Defendant's

Motion regarding the bifurcation of the divorce proceedings on
February 28, 1992 and that the property matters proceeded to trial
on March 24, 1992 is basically true. What Plaintiff did or not do
regarding introducing the children to his present wife is unknown
to Defendant and therefore denied.

Defendant can state that she

became aware of the Plaintiff's relationship with the other woman
after he had filed divorce and before the granting of the Decree of
Divorce, February 18, 1992.
6. Defendant cannot admit or deny Plaintiff's claim regarding
concern set forth in paragraph 4 of his Motion but can only state
that any express concerns regarding Defendant's mental health and
her willingness to permit Plaintiff access and visitation with the
7
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children is without basis or merit.

Here again, the Plaintiff

voluntarily, without any representations or promises on the part of
Defendant, willingly abandoned his claim for custody and joint
custody of the children.

That it is the understanding and belief

of Defendant that Plaintiff did so primarily for financial reasons
and

the

fact

that

the

Domestic

Relations

Commissioner

had

previously rejected his request for the award of temporary custody
essentially on the same basis that he is now seeking to withdraw
his Stipulation, to-wit:

the illness of Defendant.

Immediately

after Defendant's release from the hospital in February, 1991, she
returned

to

the

marital

home

and

resumed

her

duties

and

responsibilities of caring for the children, full time, as well as
the home, with very little, if any, assistance from the Plaintiff.
Further, Plaintiff did not provide her with a housekeeper or
someone to assist her in caring for the children or the home in
that it was not needed and the circumstances which existed then
remain the same now.
6.

In response to the statements and allegations of the

Plaintiff in paragraph 5 of his Motion, Defendant states that the
information contained therein is a distortion and misrepresentation
of the true facts and is therefore denied on the following basis,
to-wit:
(a)

The only time that Defendant denied Plaintiff's

request for visitation was after Defendant had exercised his
mid-week visitation on a Tuesday. Plaintiff had returned the
8
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children and requested that he take the children again on
Thursday of that week. Defendant refused Plaintiff's request
for additional mid-week visitation because of their schedule.
It would throw the children off their schedule and be
disruptive to them.

Plaintiff very often disregards

the children's schedule and visitation hours. Plaintiff has,
on many occasions, brought the children home after their
bed time, thereby affecting their school performance and
sleep schedule.

I agreed that the Plaintiff could have a

mid-week visit every week instead of every other week, under
the standard visitation schedule.

Plaintiff has received

every mid-week visit he was scheduled to receive.
(b) On one occasion in January,

Defendant was not home

because Plaintiff did not tell Defendant he was bringing the
children back early at 6:00 P.M. as opposed to the scheduled
visitation that was to terminate at 8:00 P.M.

The only

stress the children experienced was the stress Plaintiff
imposed on them because he missed a flight to Arizona.
Plaintiff knew the names of the babysitters Defendant used
and could have notified one of the babysitters and left the
children with them until he was to return the children at
the appointed hour of 8:00 P.M.

Plaintiff's claim that

Defendant fails to have the children ready for him at the
agreed time is disputed and denied.

Plaintiff's claim that

Defendant failed to be at home when the children were required
9
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to be returned is a misrepresentation of the true facts and
a situation created by Plaintiff's own lack of concern for
the welfare of the children in failing to notify Defendant
that he wanted to bring the children home earlier than the
scheduled time, as stated:
(c)

Plaintiff's claim that Defendant has been verbally

abusive to the Plaintiff and his wife in the presence of the
minor children is disputed and denied.

Defendant has not

been verbally abusive to the Plaintiff's wife, Lee, because
Defendant had not seen or talked with her at any time prior
to April 24, 1992. Further, the claim of Plaintiff that
Defendant made a derogatory statement to Plaintiff in front
of the children, to-wit: "did you know that you had little
brothers

and

sisters

all

over

South

America?" and

the

companion statement set forth in his Motion is a
misrepresentation and distortion of the true facts and
circumstances.

On the weekend of March 29, 1992, Plaintiff

had the children over the weekend for visitation.

Defendant

took advantage of this weekend and went to visit her sister in
Denver.

During this time Defendant told her sister about

the Plaintiff infecting Defendant with a sexually transmitted
disease (crabs) in South America (Peru) while Defendant was
pregnant with the parties youngest child.

Plaintiff claimed

that he had picked up the disease off a towel in a locker
room.

Defendant's sister, who is a nurse, said that this
10
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was impossible and that Mary was very naive.

When Defendant

returned to Salt Lake City to pick up the children at the
end of Plaintiff's weekend visitation, the children were in
the car and not within hearing of the conversation between
her and the Plaintiff.

Defendant confronted Plaintiff about

infecting her with the crabs and his apparent lie of how this
occurred. She asked him if the children had any younger
brothers and sisters in South America.

Plaintiff shook his

head. Defendant told Plaintiff that the crabs he had infected
her with were "real comfortable," meaning very painful and
distressful.

As stated, the children were in the car which

was in the drive-way of the home of Plaintiff's present wife,
away from the conversation which took place on the porch
outside of the hearing of the children.

Defendant has never

said anything remotely similar directly or indirectly to the
children or in their presence.
During the same weekend that Defendant was visiting with
her sister in Denver, March 29, 1992, Defendant's sister told
her about a situation of Plaintiff having an affair with a
woman from Chile while she (Defendant's sister) her husband
and Marcus had gone on a trip in Peru.

Marcus and the woman

were blatantly fondling each other on a bus trip when
Defendant's sister finally told Marcus that what he was doing
was immoral, disgusting and revolting form of behavior in
front of his own sister-in-law.
11
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When Defendant was informed of Plaintiff's upcoming
wedding and marriage plans, she called to congratulate him.
He was not home and Defendant left the following message
on his answering machine, "I'm glad you found somebody,
although Roz (the wife of a co-employee of Marcus) says she
is plain and uncouth, but I'm happy for you."
Plaintiff's attorney, asked Defendant, while under oath
during the trial, March 24, 1992, about her making an alleged
statement about Plaintiff's wife giving him good blow jobs.
Defendant stated then, under oath, that she had not made such
a statement and stated, she would never ask Plaintiff if she
(meaning his wife) gives good blow jobs.

The statements

contained in paragraph 5 (c) of Defendant's Motion is
denied and is a distortion of the statements made under oath
by Defendant at trial.
The statement contained in paragraph 5(c) of
Plaintiff's Motion regarding a recently left message on
Plaintiff's telephone answering machine, calling Plaintiff's
wife plain and uncouth has already been responded to.

The

statement that the children could be heard protesting in the
background

is

confusing

and

disputed.

The

claim

that

Defendant has left insulting messages on Plaintiff's
answering machine while the children could be heard protesting
in the back ground is likewise disputed and denied. Defendant
can only assume that Plaintiff is referring to the usual
12
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background noise of children who are playing and some times
arguing or acting as children usually do. Defendant often has
to shut her office door when making phone calls because of the
noise generated by the children when playing or engaging in
other activities. Defendant can only assume that Plaintiff is
referring to one situation over souvenir toiletry bags given
to the girls during one of Plaintiff's periods of visitation.
Defendant called the Plaintiff to thank him for the children's
gifts and in doing so stated that she wanted to thank him
for the girls toiletry bags, at which time the youngest child
commented "oh mamma," thinking that she had said toilet as a
bad word, which was not the case at all.
(d)

The statement that Defendant has taken the minor

child, Kira, to counseling sessions is true. That these have
been over Kira's objection is disputed and denied. Defendant
has taken Kira to counseling because she has been showing
signs of depression, sadness and confusion related to the
divorce and her father's recent marriage.

The therapist has

informed Defendant that this is a usual reaction in situations
where there is divorce and a quick marriage by one spouse.
Each time that Kira goes to therapy, the therapist states,
reminds her and reaffirms that she does not have to be in
therapy or sit through any of the sessions if she does not
want to.

That he does not want her to feel that she is

being forced to sit through sessions.

Kira is beginning to
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build a rapport with the therapist and it appears that the
Plaintiff is trying to sabotage Defendant's efforts to deal
with the child's depression, sadness and confusion brought
on by the divorce and Plaintiff's recent marriage in that he
has argued with Defendant over the expense of therapy and has
told Defendant he does not believe in it.

Defendant is of

the opinion that the concerns of the Plaintiff are more
financial rather than what is in the best interest of the
minor child.
(e)

Defendant denies the statements of Plaintiff that

she threatened to cut off his visitation rights.
has never threatened to do so.

Defendant

Defendant told the Plaintiff

that he should not have the children and could not have the
children over night when he is in the presence of his
girlfriend, Lee, to whom he was not married.

That she

deemed this to be immoral and not in the best interest of
the minor children. Defendant suggested that Plaintiff bring
the children home Saturday night and then pick them up on
Sunday mornings if he wanted to spend Saturday nights with his
girlfriend in her home.

His usual weekend visits with the

children are Saturday at 9:00 A.M. to Sunday, 3:00 P.M.
Defendant has requested often that Plaintiff take the children
for a longer period of time to which his response was "these
are only guidelines - I don't have to take the kids on
Fridays and later on Sunday, if I don't want to - I have
14
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errands to run and things to do." This is clearly an example
that Plaintiff

is more concerned about his own interest,

rather than the best interest and welfare of the minor
children.
(f)

The statement of Plaintiff that Defendant would not

allow visitation if he and his wife discuss visitation or
custody with the children is a mis-statement of the facts and
circumstances and therefore denied as untrue. Defendant asked
Plaintiff (Marcus) and his wife to not discuss custody issues
with Kira, due to the fact it was confusing and upsetting to
her.

Defendant did state to Plaintiff that if Plaintiff and

his wife continued to discuss custody issues with Kira, she
would

have

to

contact

her

lawyer

and

request

that

a

Restraining Order be issued, restraining the Plaintiff and
his wife from discussing custody matters and other divorce
issues with the children.

Also, the fact that Plaintiff's

wife, Lee, had demanded Erika (age 5) to call Lee "mom" which
confused and traumatized her to the point of tears.
(g)

The statements of Plaintiff in paragraph 5(g) of

his Motion are disputed and denied.

Some time last summer,

after Defendant had visited her family in Denver, Colorado,
with the minor children, the subject came up on inquiry of
the children.

The children asked Defendant if she intended

to move to Colorado.

Defendant responded that she

thought it would be nice after she graduated and had obtained
15
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her masters and teaching certificate because jobs for teaching
in Utah were scarce.

Defendant denies that she ever stated

that she would move to Colorado so that she could have the
children all to herself.

Defendant does not recall the

subject coming up or being discussed since last summer.
The fact remains that the children have grandparents and
many loving aunts, uncles and cousins in Denver which they
know, love and enjoy visiting..
(h)

The statements of Plaintiff in subparagraph 5(h)

of his Motion that Defendant has acted in a manner

to

intentionally upset the minor children when he picks them
up for scheduled visitation is a total mis-statement, is
false and denied.

Defendant would never try to intentionally

upset her own children.
(i)

The statements of Plaintiff in paragraph 5(i) of

his Motion that Defendant left messages on Plaintiff's
answering machine, insulting and demeaning Plaintiff's wife
is denied and untrue.

If Plaintiff is referring to Defendant

repeating the statement made by Roz to Defendant, this was
only a comment to Plaintiff regarding such statement and
how other people, who knew Lee, his wife, perceived her.
Defendant did leave a request and warning on Plaintiff's
answering machine to the effect that he and his wife were
not to talk to Kira about custody and to discontinue upsetting
and traumatizing the children by forcing Erika to call Lee
16
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mom.

That if the Plaintiff and his wife persisted in this

course of conduct, Defendant would have no alternative but to
contact her attorney in an effort to seek a Restraining
Order, as stated above.
7.

The statements of Plaintiff, in paragraph 6 of his Motion

are disputed and denied in that they are without fact, merit or
basis.

The upset and trauma the children have experienced is a

direct result of Plaintiff and his wife discussing the issues of
custody with the children and forcing the children to do things
against their will.
8.

Defendant denies and disputes all of the statements and

allegations of Plaintiff in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of his Motion on
the basis of hearsay and supposition on the part of Plaintiff.
Defendant is unable to admit or deny what Plaintiff believes or
does not believe.

However, the statements of Plaintiff, based on

his belief, are without factual basis or merit.
When the children return home from visits with their father
and his new wife, they are generally irritable and at times moody.
The children have stated they do not like sharing their father with
Lee, his wife, all the time. The youngest child came home crying
and upset from one of the latest visits with her father because he
and his wife were trying to force her to eat everything on her
plate and she wasn't hungry. The children have informed Defendant
that on weekend visits that they have had so far, they are left to
play with the children across the street most of the afternoon.
17
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Plaintifffs new wife, Lee, has never been married before, has
never had children of her own and apparently has little or no
parenting skills, evidenced by her attempts to force the youngest
child to eat when she is not hungry. The children have related to
Defendant that Lee, Plaintiff's wife,, does not like the word "stepmom" and has forced the children to call her "mom."

Defendant is

informed that Plaintiff's wife does not approve of the clothing the
children wear.
friends.

It is not good enough and not presentable to her

The last weekend visitation, April 25,1992, Plaintiff's

wife took the children to Nordstrom's and bought them new clothing
and then took them and introduced
them to her friends as "her children" when in fact they are not her
children.

The clothing she purchased for Erika was too tight.

When Erika returned home, she complained about her pants hurting
her and started to cry.

When her pants were removed, there were

red rings around her waist, evidencing that the clothing was the
wrong size and her pants had been too tight, causing her discomfort
and pain.

Also, on the last weekend visitation, April 25, 1992,

Defendant contacted Plaintiff by phone and informed him that she
would drive by and pick up the children Sunday afternoon at the
time he had indicated he would return the children in anticipation
of her running some errands. Plaintiff refused, stating he did not
want Defendant to come to the home of his present wife because he
was afraid there might be a confrontation.

Defendant stated she

did not feel this would occur in that there had been a smooth
18
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exchange of the children on Friday afternoon with his wife when the
children were picked up. Defendant then suggested that she remain
in the car and Plaintiff bring the children out to the car.
Plaintiff again refused, stating he did not want to do it that way.
It was then suggested that the parties meet on mutual ground, at
Mervyn's at 4:30 P.M.

Plaintiff agreed.

Defendant stated to

Plaintiff, "you are still having a power struggle with me. You are
just going to have to get an emotional divorce, not just a physical
divorce."

Defendant regarded this, as well as his Motion, to be a

continuation of Plaintiff's power struggle against Defendant in
that he continues to try and control and dominate Defendant through
the children, via visitation, payment of alimony and the children's
school expenses.
9. Defendant questions the sincerity of Plaintiff in entering
into his recent marriage.

Plaintiff told Defendant, in the

presence of Kira's therapist, just before he entered into marriage,
that he did not want to get married.

He wanted Defendant to sign

a statement that the children could visit with him over night in
the presence of his girlfriend, without the benefit of marriage and
requested that the therapist be a witness to such statement.
Defendant indicated that the situation he wanted to create and
place the children in, in her opinion was immoral, not in the best
interest of the minor children, and contrary to their religious
training and principals.

Plaintiff became angry.

At that time

Defendant told Plaintiff that he should get married if he wanted to
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visit with the children on an overnight basis in the presence of
his girlfriend, who would then be his wife.

In a matter of days,

the Plaintiff remarried.
Plaintiff told Defendant on another occasion, that he did not
desire to marry again, he was only doing so because he could not
afford to pay rent for a separate apartment and because Defendant
would not let him take the children over night with an unmarried
woman, his girlfriend, in her house, since it would conflict with
the

morals

and

values

of

the

children

that

their

Catholic

upbringing had taught and was teaching them, which Defendant has
tried to foster and instill in them.
10.

Despite all of the stress that has occurred the past

winter and spring, related to the divorce, Defendant has maintained
an over all 3.8 grade average while attending the University and
was

accepted

into

the

School

of Education

in

an

extremely

competitive field of applications (See attachments hereto).
11.

Contrary to the statements of Plaintiff, based on his

beliefs, Kira's therapist has related to Defendant that Kira seems
like

a

very

mature

girl

and

other

than

some

depression,

characterized by crying, and confusion because of the problems
associated with the divorce, Kira is alright. Erika, the youngest,
is in kindergarten, knows how to read and do simple math problems.
Neither child has ever stated to Defendant that they would like to
see their father more often.
12.

It has been necessary for the Defendant to incur
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additional cost and expense for attorney's fees in connection with
this Motion.

It is appropriate that the Plaintiff be required to

pay Defendant's attorney's fees and costs.
WHEREFORE, Based upon this Reply, Defendant prays that the
Motion of Plaintiff be dismissed and denied and that she be awarded
her attorney's fees and such other and further relief as the Court
deems proper.
DATED this

"

day of May, 1992.

/

rtmum

E.^f. FAJJKHAtfSER
Attorney for Defendant
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Personally

ss.

)

appeared

before

me, MARY

E. RANDOLPH,

who

acknowledged to me that she is the Defendant named in the foregoing
action.
Motion

That she has read the foregoing Reply to Plaintiff's
and the matters

stated

therein

are true to her own

knowledge, except as to matters stated on information and belief
and as to such matters she believes them to be true.

MARY E

Subscril
May,

^>
1 9 9 2 . f/Q

^apdpj
My
Comrr*£*icn

:n to before me this
#

<

s

day of

Expire* fcav'.1,1392

LOU J£ANN£ LEFLEfi \l
243 E^et 400 So., Suae 200
3art U * c Ctty,
UT 94111

/>

£ Of V

v

;|

NOTARY PEfBLIC
~
'
Residing in Salt Lake County. Utah
My Commission Expires: <T///~/p2--

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Kellie F. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 South Main
Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this *-?'

day

of May, 1992
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Education Advising Center
226 Milton Bennion Hall
University of Utah
To the Admissions Committee:
As her professor in two fairly demanding courses in Research Methods (Winter,
1991) and Community Psychology (Spring, 1991), I highly recommend Ms. Mary E.
Randolph for admission to the program in elementary teacher education.
The methods course took a generalist and practical approach to the conduct and
consumption of social science research. Since 1 am an applied research
psychologist, most of the illustrations of research design were relevant to
educational studies (program evaluation, need assessment, survey,
consultation, etc.). The content of the community psychology course is even
more relevant to a degree in education (including school-based prevention
programming and community mental health, stress, coping and social support,
theories of applied social ecology, self help, citizen participation and
empowerment, community intervention, etc.).
Mary received received an A- in Research Methods. The centerpiece of the
course requirements was the planning and completion of a community-based
empirical research project in each lab. Mary worked on a valuable and
well-researched project in conjunction with the Salt Lake Community Services
Council (CSC) evaluating the Salt Lake Food Bank's free food distribution
program. Mary was primarily responsible for conducting the pilot survey of
clients at a food pantry site and for helping to develop the final
questionnaire for the project. The report from this project was used and
greatly appreciated by the CSC.
In the community psychology course, Mary received a strong A grade. This
course involved an even more ambitious class project: a community needs
assessment, in which Mary interviewed residents in a low-income neighborhood
and wrote a section of the final report. She received an A for her
participation in the project. This project was so successful that it spun off
an on-going student volunteer service project in that same community to
follow-up on the needs that were identified.
She received a perfect (extremely rare) score on her final essay exam and an
almost perfect score on a critical research article review assignment.
Finally, on a more personal plane, during the time that Mary was taking these
two courses she was experiencing a tremendous amount of family-related stress
in her life. She nevertheless responded with a conscientious and diligent
commitment to scholastic achievement and to teaching and helping children.
Again, given her ability to adapt with a positive, good natured personality to
the difficult and diverse requirements of my courses,}ym% to mention the
course of life, I recommend Ms .•-Randolph highly,
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UNIVERSITY
o^UTAH
February 20, 1992

Mary Randolph
1156 So. Foothill #135
SLC, UT 84102
Dear Mary,
Congratulations on your admission to the Elementary Teacher Education
Program!
Over the next year, you will be intensely involved in learning to become
a teacher. Our hope is that you'll develop an in-depth understanding of
schooling, teaching, and learning essential to functioning as a professional
educator.
To provide a system of support while enrolled, students take the
professional core courses as members of a cohort group. The cohort
organization has been adopted to encourage peer support and criticism, enhance
growth, and provide for continuous evaluation and feedback. It is our belief
that collaborative work like this will carry over into the schools.
Because space in each cohort is limited, you must make arrangements to
meet with the Education Advisor. When you come in, you'll fill-out a program
planning sheet and discuss which cohort you'll be entering.
Please contact
the Education Advising Center (226 MBH, 581-7789) to set-up an appointment.
As an admitted student, you're required to maintain certain standards.
One of these is that your cumulative g.p.a. be no lower than 2.7.
Additionally, you must obtain a grade of "C" or better in your education
coursework. For a full description of departmental policies on retention,
refer to "Retention Policies and Procedures" (available from the EAC).
If I can be of assistance to you, please let me know.
success in the program.

I wish you much

Sincerely,
Andrew Gitlin
Director, Teacher Certification Programs
Department of Educational Studies
AG/sg
xc: student file
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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH CHILD AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENT CENTER
COMPETENCY RATING FORM
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PERSONAL QUALITIES:
L.

1 = excellent
5 = poor
1 2

•
•
•
•
•
•

G e n e r a l Appearance
Self-confidence
Punctuality
Cooperation with

staff

S e e k s a s s e s s m e n t of
C r e a t i v e model f o r

self
children

Functions independently

8

Attitude
a. Greets or acknowledges the presence of children
upon arrival

e. Speaks with a pleasant, distinct we11-modulated
voice
9.

4

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

5

•
•
•
•
•
•

s• • • •
• • • •

b. Shows friendliness and affection towards children ^
c. Engages in one to one conversations with children
d. Shows pleasure/enjoyment/humor/playfulness by
laughing or smiling when interfacing with children

3

A

'—' '—' '—' '—'

Km • • •

• • • •
• D• •

Familiarity with facility routines
a. Looks at written plans and/or consulted with
other staff about schedule and/or procedure
b* Appears to be aware of the schedule

OMMENTS:
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• • • •
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Ability to help child interpret, verbalize and deal
with emotions
2

3

4

5

a. Allowed or encouraged children to help peers or
help with routine tasks

p — i i — . .—, , — i ,—
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b . Thanks children for helping or being thoughtful

H

•

•

•

•

c. Encourages children to take turns or share

B
•
•
•
•
for taking turns or nrpr \—i i—• .—. ,—.

d. Praises/acknowledges children
sharing
'
e. Gives children the time to work out problems

f. Models appropriate ways to solve interpersonal
problems
g. Encourages children to verbally express needs
and/or feelings to others

.
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h. Encourages children to listen to one another
i. Attempts to help peers understand each other
intentions
Ability to use appropriate guidance techniques

H D •
•
•
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L2<J l_J L_J L_J L_J

a. Arranges environment to avoid problems
b. Gives directions or sets limits positively

H •
•
•
•
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c. Gives choices

a

Ability to assess children in areas of creativity
and talent

^7*1 1—11—11—11—1
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U

•

•
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r W u \AeecXs Ao orocVice proper auidcj/vvce +ejckniaues>
/aluation of Student's Planned 'Projects
L. Were all assigned projects completed:
Y e s x No
2. Were plans for assignments handed in on time?
Yes X No"
3. Was planning for each project adequate?
Yes*T No"
I. Were projects appropriate for group?
Y e s x No"
5. Was student able to hold children's interest?
Yes X No"
5. Was student creative in presentation and/or
visual aids developed?
Y&syC No
Was student able to relate projects to individual
children?
Y e s X No
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3. Was student able to adjust
to unforeseen incidents? YesvL.No"
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•>RKING WITH CHILDREN:

1

2

3

4

5

B D D D D

Ability to accept and work with individuals

Classroom management skills

s • • • •
• H" • • •

a. Sets limits clearly and follows through

• IS • •

Ability to work with small groups
Ability to work with large groups

• • • •

b. Redirects
c.

Encourages independence and s e l f - h e l p s k i l l s

l^fl

d. Is usually positioned to be able to see most
of the children at one time

I—II—II—II—I
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e. Often visually scans the entire area
f. Prevents problems from occurring
g. Responds quickly when misbehavior or problems

•

rcn

i—i i—i i—i r—i

Ability to relate to children
a. Non-verbal skills
1)

Makes eye contact with children

ucl

I—II—II—II—I

2)

Matches nonverbal b e h a v i o r w i t h verbal

p--| i—i

3)

Remains calm and r e a s o n a b l e when s e t t i n g
l i m i t s or d i s c i p l i n i n g

fr>n
I^J

i

b.

Verbal

i—i

i—i i — i

i — ii — ii—i i—i
l_J l_J l_J l_J

skills

• • • •

1)

Encourages language u s e

2)

U s e s vocabulary a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e
developmental l e v e l of t h e c h i l d r e n

i—i
l_l

rr^
I2S

\—i i—i i—i
L_l l_J LJ

3)

I n t r o d u c e s new v o c a b u l a r y i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s
with children

^

i—i

i—i

4)

Speaks with correct grammar
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Ability to implement learning
a.
Adaptability in curriculum
b.

1 2
3 4 5
p - , i—i i—i i—• •—•
«-^J '—' '—' '—' I — '

Permits exploration

s n n n •
c.

Stimulates curiosity and creativity

H• • • •
1) Asks open-ended questions
2) Encourages pretend play and imagination
LI
Ability to relate to parents
L2
Skill in understanding procedures and policies
Ability to meet individual needs and differences
L3. Willingness to participate in pre- and
post-conference discussion
L4 . Cooperation in helping other students with their
activities

LO
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